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GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PLANS OF CORPORATE
REORGANIZATION
JOHN GERDES t
So far, in the development of the principles of plans of corporate
reorganization, we have reversed the natural order. We have dealt
primarily with plans involving the reorganization of railroads and
other corporations with highly complex capital structures. We have
sought to evolve the principles of plans of reorganization in compli-
cated situations and then apply them to the simpler situations. We
have proceeded from the complex to the simple, instead of from the
simple to the complex.
A critical analysis of the principles of plans of reorganization
should be made.' The efficacy of the principles should be tested in
situations involving simple corporate structures in order that we may
judge the results more clearly. The extent to *which old principles
have been modified by the statutory procedure provided by Chapter
X 2 of the Bankruptcy Act should be determined.
I. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
When a corporation, other than a railroad, insurance, banking,
or municipal corporation, or a building and loan association, finds that
'it is unable to meet its obligations as they mature, or that its assets
t B. Litt., 19o7, Berea College; A. M., i9io, LL. B., igo, LL. M., 19I 1, J. D., 1912,
New York University; member of the firm of Gerdes & Montgomery of the New York
Bar; Chairman, Committee on Reorganizations of the American Bar Association
(Commercial Law Section); Chairman, Committee on Bankruptcy and Reorganization
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York; Professor of the Law of Cor-
porate Reorganizations at the New York University School of Law; Author of CoR-
PORATE REORGANIZATIONS (3 vOl. 1936) and numerous articles in legal periodicals.
I. Some of the articles written on the subject are: Dodd, The Los Angeles Lum-
ber Products Company Case and Its Implications (1940) 53 HxAv. L. REV. 713; Doug-
las and Frank, Landlord Claims in Reorganizations (1933) 42 YALE L. J. Ioo3; Foster,
Conflicting Ideals for Reorganization (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 923; Frank, Some Realistic
Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate Reorganization (1933) 19 VA. L. REv. 541,
698; Friendly, Some Comments on the Corporate Reorganization Act (934) 48 HARv.
L. REV. 39, 74-81; Gerdes, A Fair and Equitable Plan of Corporate Reorganization
under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act (1934) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rzv. I; Graham,
Fair Reorganization Plans under Chapter X of the Chandler Act (1938) BROOKLYN L.
Ray. 137; Payne, Fair and Equitable Plans of Corporate Reorganization (1933) 20
VA. L. REV. 37; Rosenberg, Reorganization-Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow (1938) 25
VA. L. REv. 129, 136; Spaeth and Winks, The Boyd Case and Section 77 (1938) 32
ILL. L. REv. 769; Swanstrom, Stockholders' Participation in Reorganization (1939) 28
GEO. L. J. 336. See also FINLETTER, THE LAw OF BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION
(I939) 416 et seq.; 2 Gmwas, CoPORATE REORGANIZATIONS (936) §§ 1036-1106.
2. 52 STAT. 883-95, ii U. S. C. A. §§ 5oi-676 (i94O). The Bankruptcy Act con-
tains sections numbered from I to 703. Chapter X is contained in those sections num-
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tion numbers.
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are less in value than the amount of its liabilities, relief may be had
(I) by immediate liquidation in bankruptcy,3 (2) by liquidation over
a period of years through the medium of a plan of reorganization
(which should more accurately be termed a plan of liquidation), or
(3) by reorganization under a plan of reorganization.
Selection of the relief sought should be determined by the best
interests of the creditors and others who have interests in the corpora-
tion. Thus, liquidation should be resorted to if it will result in the
realization of greater values for creditors and stockholders; reor-
ganization is desirable if it will preserve for creditors and stockholders
values which would be lost by liquidation. Reorganization preserves
going-concern values which are usually lost by liquidation. It is
therefore preferable unless the conditions of the industry, or the physi-
cal condition of the equipment, or some other factor, prevents effec-
tive reorganization, or unless full going-concern values may be pre-
served by a sale of the business for a full and adequate price.4
A. Development of the Law
Our law on the reorganization of corporations was, prior to the
enactment of Sections 77 ' and 77B 6 of the Bankruptcy Act in 1933
and 1934, developed very largely in equity receiverships involving the
reorganization of railroads. 7 This is due to a definite public policy
which demanded, and still demands, that the operation of railroads
be continued for the benefit of the public, regardless of the best inter-
ests of their creditors and stockholders. Railroads are therefore not
permitted to liquidate under the Bankruptcy Act. Even if liquidation
were permitted, the nature of the assets of a railroad and the large
values involved are such as to make it impractical except in rare and
isolated instances.
The principles of reorganization have therefore been evolved in
connection with the reorganization of corporations with large and
unusually complicated capital structures-with numerous outstanding
issues of bonds, secured by first, second, third and even fourth liens,
as well as issues having different liens on different assets (first lien
on some assets, second lien on other assets, etc.). Railroads with
from ten to twenty issues of bonds, each with different rights and
interests, are not uncommon. The difficulties in unraveling these com-
3. §4.
4. Matter of Porto Rican American Tobacco Co., S. E. C., CoRPORATE REoRG. REL.
27 (1940).
5. §77.
6. § 77B.
7. I GERDES, op. cit. supra note i at §§ 10-12.
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plex structures, in accurately determining the values of the respective
rights and interests of holders of the various issues of bonds and
stock, and in equitably allotting interests in the reorganized corpora-
tion to such holders, were never completely overcome in the equity
receivership.8
At first the rights of security holders were left entirely to the vol-
untary agreement of the owners of the securities, acting through so-
called protective committees. Dissenters were compelled to take their
portion of such price as the reorganization committee, representing
the security holders accepting the plan, might voluntarily bid for the
assets of the corporation at the sale. Later, a small measure of pro-
tection to dissenters was given by the fixing by the court of a mini-
mum upset price below which the assets, could not be sold. Still later,
under the so-called doctrine of the Boyd case,10 the courts began to
examine plans to see whether their provisions wrongfully diverted to
stockholders, interests in the reorganized corporation which should have
been distributed to creditors."1
But the protection which the courts of equity could give to non-
assenting creditors and stockholders prior to the enactment of the re-
organization provisions of the Bankruptcy Act in 1933, 1934, and
subsequent years, was limited. They had no adequate machinery to
appraise the value of the various interests. In the main, the rights of
creditors and stockholders depended on the bargaining powers of their
committees, and the courts could only prevent glaring instances of
unfairness.
12
B. The Objectives of a Reorganization
The first objective of a reorganization should be the production
of a sound economic unit-a corporation able to operate its business
successfully and pay a reasonable return to those having interests in it.
8. Dodd, Reorganiation, Through Bankruptcy: A Remedy for What? (1935) 48
HARv. L. Ray. Ioo, Ioo-iiio; Friendly, note r supra at 41-49; Fuller, The Back-
ground and Techniques of Equity and Bankruptcy Railroad Reorganization (1940) 7
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 377, 383.
9. For a general discussion of use of upset prices in corporate reorganizations, see
2 GmEtns, op. cit. supra note I, §§ IO49-IO66; Weiner, Conflicting Functions of the Up-
set Price (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 132.
io. Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482 (913). The application of this
doctrine to corporate reorganizations is discussed in detail at p. 48 infra.
ii. Dodd, note 8 supra at IIOI.
12. Two decisions of the Supreme Court at about the time of the enactment of Sec-
tion 77B indicated that plans effectuated through equity receiverships would be subject
to closer scrutiny to determine their fairness. First National Bank v. Flershem, 29o
U. S. 5o4 (I34) ; National Surety Co. v. Coriell, 289 U. S. 426 (I933).
The development of the principles of equity to be applied in the formulation of a
fair plan of reorganization constitutes an interesting chapter in the history of our fed-
eral judicial system. I GERDus, op. cit. supra note i at § IO.
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Unless this is accomplished, losses will continue, liquidation or another
reorganization at a subsequent date will be necessary, and all losses
sustained in the intervening period will diminish the amounts which
could have been distributed to creditors and stockholders if liquida-
tion or an effective reorganization had occurred in the first place.
The statutes recognize this objective by requiring that the court must
find that the plan is "feasible". 18
The next important objective is an equitable distribution of inter-
ests in the reorganized corporation among the creditors and stockhold-
ers of the old corporation. This is also one of the prime purposes of a
liquidation in bankruptcy, 14 the difference being that in bankruptcy the
assets of the corporation are converted into cash, which is distributed,
while in reorganization the assets are retained, in whole or in part, by
the corporation, and interests in such assets are distributed in the form
of new or revised interests (obligations assumed or shares of stock)
in the reorganized corporation.
Most reorganizations also involve liquidation in part. Excess
inventories may be reduced, and unprofitable plants or other assets sold.
If sufficient cash is realized, creditors may receive cash for part of
their claims, and obligations or stock of the corporation for the balance.
A recognition that reorganization as well as liquidation is a pro-
cedure to divide the assets of the corporation among those entitled to
them, is fundamental. Without this recognition there can be no ade-
quate discussion of the principles of a plan of reorganization.
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
When people extend credit to or purchase the securities of a cor-
poration they bargain and pay for certain rights and privileges. An
unsecured creditor bargains for payment of a specified amount on a
specified date, with or without interest, and, if with interest, at a
rate expressly agreed upon or at a rate which by the law of the juris-
diction in which the transaction occurs is made a part of his contract.
Under the common law, upon a default in the payment of either prin-
cipal or interest, each creditor may procure a judgment fixing the
amount due to him from the debtor, and, by appropriate legal pro-
cedure, may then seize and sell such assets of the debtor as are avail-
able and apply the proceeds to the satisfaction of his judgment. A
"race of diligence" results, and unless the assets of the debtor are suffi-
13. §§ 14, 22 (2).
14. Maynard v. Elliott, 283 U. S. 273, 277 (0931); GLENN, LiQumATioN (1935)
§ 3; Swaine, Reorganization--An Atnendment to the Bankruptcy Act (r933) g VA.
L. REv. 317, 322-323.
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cient upon quick liquidation to pay all creditors in full, some creditors
will be paid in full, while others will receive nothing, or only a part
of their claims. The indiscriminate seizure and quick sale of assets
will destroy the business of the debtor and most of the value of the
assets will be sacrificed.
All of our bankruptcy statutes, since the enactment of the first
English Bankruptcy Act in i542, have sought to prevent the common-
law race of diligence among creditors when its result will be an inequi-
table distribution of assets among creditors having equal rights. Such
statutes have provided for a sale of all the assets of the debtor and
a pro rata distribution of the proceeds among unsecured creditors when
the debtor is insolvent. And, as under the common law,15 creditors
are. paid in full before there is any distribution to stockholders.
In equity receiverships also the courts sell all of the assets of the
debtor and distribute the proceeds pro rata among the unsecured cred-
itors, nothing going to stockholders until all creditors have been paid
in full.' 6
Bankruptcy and equity receivership proceedings successfully pre-
vented discrimination among creditors having equal rights when the
assets of the debtor were insufficient to enable all creditors to be paid
in full, but they provided no substitute for the common-law require-
ment that the assets of the debtor be liquidated by an immediate sale.
The problem of preventing the sacrifice of going-concern values still
remained.
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 sought to meet this problem by the
provisions of Section 12,17 dealing with "compositions". Under this
Section a bankrupt, in a bankruptcy proceeding, could make an offer to
all his unsecured creditors for the satisfaction of their claims by pay-
ment of part of such claims.' If the holders of a majority in number
and amount of claims accepted the offer, and if the court found that
it was for the best interests of the creditors that the offer be accepted,
all creditors were bound to accept the payments provided in the com-
position agreement in full satisfaction of their claims. The statute
i5. At the common law, stockholders have no right to receive any of the assets of
the corporation except in payment of dividends which have been declared. Dividends
may be declared only out of the surplus remaining after sufficient assets are set aside
to cover the capital of the corporation and all the claims of creditors. Upon dissolu-
tion, all classes of creditors are paid in full in the order of their priority before any of
the assets are divided among the stockholders.
16. Kansas City Terminal Ry. v. Central Union Trust Co. of New York, 271 U. S.
445 (1926) ; Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482 (1913).
17. 30 STAT. 549 (18g8), II U. S. C. A. § 30 (1934).
18. While compositions involving the giving of notes as well as cash have been
confirmed, it has never been satisfactorily established that creditors could be compelled
to accept other securities under a composition agreement. In re Kornbluth, 65 F. (2d)
40o (C. C. A. 2d, 1933) ; In re Isidor Klein, Inc., 22 F. (2d) 9o6 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).
See GLENN, LIQUIDATION (935) § 380.
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was construed as authorizing courts to approve compositions only when
the offer gave to creditors at least the substantial equivalent of what
they would receive if the bankruptcy were continued.19
The theory of the composition was simple: If a majority of the
creditors wished to avoid the risks of liquidation in bankruptcy, and if
all creditors would receive at least as much on their claims under the
composition agreement as they would receive if the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding continued to consummation, a sacrifice of the going-concern
value of the assets of the bankrupt by quick sale was unnecessary as
well as inequitable.
Nothing was taken from dissenting creditors by a composition
agreement except the right arbitrarily to insist on a sale of assets, which
would result in no benefit to them. All that composition did was to
deprive individual creditors having rights in property commonly owned
by all the creditors and stockholders (if the bankrupt was a corpora-
tion) from insisting upon a particular remedy-an immediate sale of
such property-against the wishes and interests of a majority of those
having the common interest. The sale would bring injury upon the
others, without any benefit to the person insisting thereon. The com-
position agreement was a new protection given to both creditors and
stockholders in that both were now assured that compulsory liquida-
tion, with its resulting loss in values, would not be necessary simply
because a minority, however small, might arbitrarily insist upon it.
There is no moral or equitable principle which gives to a minority a
vested right to sacrifice the interests of all by insistence upon a rem-
edy which can only result in a loss to all.20
The procedure in Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, enacted in
1934, definitely aimed at this preservation and distribution of going-
concern values instead of liquidation values among those having claims
against or interests in the corporation. If two-thirds of each class of
creditors and a majority of each class of stockholders having an equity
in the assets accepted the plan of reorganization, and the court found
that the plan fairly and equitably distributed interests in the corpora-
tion to those entitled to such interests, dissenting minorities were com-
pelled to take the securities or other property allotted to them under
the plan in satisfaction of their claims or interests. 21 Creditors or stock-
holders of a non-accepting class could not be compelled to take new se-
curities for their interests, but dissenting creditors or stockholders of
i. In re Reiman, 20 Fed. Cas. 490, 496, No. 11,673 (S. D. N. Y. x874), aff'd, 20
Fed. Cas. 500, No. 11,675 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. r875). See United States ex rel. Adler
v. Hammond, 1n4 Fed. 862, 868 (C. C. A. 6th, Igoo).
20. See Matter of People, 264 N. Y. 69, 92, i9o N. E. 153, i61 (i934); Head v.
Amoskeag Manufacturing Co., r13 U. S. 9, 21 (1885).
21. § 77B (e) C), (f) (W, (g).
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an accepting class were compelled to take the securities allotted to them
under the plan.
The provisions of the present Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act
are similar in the foregoing respects to the provisions of the super-
seded Section 7 7B, except that classes of creditors and stockholders,
if the court finds the plan fair and equitable, are bound if the plan
receives the assent of two-thirds or a majority, respectively, of those in
their classes who have filed individual proofs of clam or interest, in-
stead of these proportions of each entire class.
22
A. Recognition of Priorities
In equity receivership and composition, as well as in dissolution,
bankruptcy and the enforcement of the common law rights of creditors,
it is clear that we are dealing with liquidation procedures under which,
in the absence of an express agreement waiving such right, each credi-
tor and stockholder is entitled to such amount in cash (or notes of the
bankrupt, in the case of a composition) as represents the full liquidation
value of his claim, giving effect to all of his priorities and other rights.
All secured creditors and creditors having priorities must be paid in
full before creditors without priority or security may receive anything;
unsecured creditors must be paid in full before any payment may be
made to stockholders; and preferred stockholders are entitled to pay-
ment to the full extent of their preferences before payment may be
made to common stockholders. In each of these procedures the
minimum amount which a creditor or stockholder can be compelled to
take was his equity in the debtor, calculated on the basis of liquidation
values. In composition, he might have secured a larger amount if the
composition agreement so provided. In bankruptcy or equity receiver-
ship, he may secure the going-concern value of his interest and waive
his right to payment in cash of its liquidation value, by voluntary
acceptance of a plan of reorganization. But in no instance may he be
deprived, without his consent, of his full common-law right to have the
liquidation value of the debtor's assets appropriated to the satisfaction
of his entire claim before any part of such value is paid to holders of
junior claims and interests.
In the case of enforcement of common-law rights, in bankruptcy,
and in the equity receivership, this liquidation value is fixed by the
amount of the net proceeds realized from the sale. In composition,
the liquidation value of the interests of the creditors is determined by
the court, which, before approving the composition agreement, is com-
pelled to find that the composition gives to creditors the full equivalent
22. § 179.
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of what they would receive if liquidation in bankruptcy were com-
pleted.
As already pointed out, the reorganization procedures provided in
Section 77B and Chapter X do not seek to divide the proceeds of a
liquidation of the assets of the debtor. Rather they preserve from
destruction going-concern values which are thus made available for the
payment of claims against and interests in the debtor.
Nor do the provisions in Section 77B or Chapter X show any
intent to change the contract and common-law priorities of creditors
and stockholders in this process of distribution. In fact, the contrary
intent is clearly expressed: the assents of stockholders are not necessary,
and the plan may wipe out their interests without making provision for
them, if the debtor is insolvent 2 3 i. e. if the assets of the debtor are
not sufficient to cover the claims of its creditors in full; 24 and provision
for non-assenting classes of creditors need only be made to the extent
of the value of their interests in the property of the debtor.
The preservation of going-concern values merely enlarges the pot
available for distribution; it does not change the relative interests or
equities of creditors and stockholders in the pot. Creditors and stock-
holders both benefit from this preservation of going-concern values.
Where the corporation is solvent on the basis of liquidation values, the
entire benefit inures to stockholders; where the corporation is insolvent
even on the basis of going-concern values, the entire benefit goes to
creditors; in all other cases both creditors and stockholders reap the
benefits.
B. Absolute Priority Theory
When the assets of the debtor are taken by the court in the reor-
ganization proceeding, the bargained-for rights and priorities (as to
liens on property as security, rights of priority upon the distribution of
assets, rates of interest, date of maturity, etc.) of the creditors and
stockholders become effective. Full effect should be given to these
rights and priorities in valuing the equity of each class of creditors and
stockholders in the assets of the debtor. Interests in the reorganized
corporation should not be given to classes of creditors and stockholders
if they have no equity. This is the "absolute priority theory". 25
23. § 77B (b) (4), (e) W); §§ 179, 216 (8).
24. § 1 (19).
25. The Securities and Exchange Commission has strongly urged the adoption of
the absolute priority theory. See address by Jerome N. Frank, Chairman, Securities
and Exchange- Commission, delivered before Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, March 27, 194o; and address by J. Anthony Panuch, Special Counsel, Reor-
ganization Division, Securities and Exchange Commission, delivered before New York
County Lawyers Ass'n, Nov. 21, 1939, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 22, 1939, p. io, col. 5.
See also reports of Securities and Exchange Commission on plans in specific reor-
ganization.
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Going-concern values may be created or lost by the changes or
readjustments provided for in the plan. In either event, the interests
available for distribution to the old creditors and stockholders are inter-
ests in the debtor as reorganized under the plan. These interests must
therefore be evaluated to determine whether creditors and stockholders
have been accorded their respective legal rights and priorities. The fair-
ness of the plan must be tested by the value--although not necessarily
the market price 26-of the securities or other consideration given to
creditors and stockholders under the plan. If classes of creditors and
stockholders having priority receive value fully equivalent to the legal
amount of their claims or interests, subsequent classes may be awarded
an interest under the plan. The grant of an interest to a subordinate
class when a prior class has not received full value, renders the plan
unfair and inequitable.
2 7
If the secured creditor receives the full value of his bargained-for
rights, and the common stockholder receives no more than he is entitled
to, neither may justly complain if payment is made to each in securities
of the same class.28 If, on the other hand, the secured creditor is
deprived of the full value of his interest, and the stockholder receives
an interest in the reorganized debtor which should have been given to
the secured creditor, then the plan is unfair and inequitable, even if the
face amount of the new securities given to the secured creditor is equal
to the full amount of his claim and such new securities are given full
priority in the distribution of assets on dissolution over the new
securities given to common stockholders,
To illustrate: If the going-concern value of the reorganized cor-
poration is $700,ooo, and the debtor has $i,ooo,ooo of secured bonds
and $500,000 par value of common stock outstanding, and there are
no unsecured creditors or preferred stockholders, a plan which gives
$i,ooo,ooo *par value of new preferred stock to the holders of the se-
cured bonds and gives all the new common stock (regardless of the
par value of such shares) to the old stockholders, is unfair. Under
these facts, the bondholders are entitled to all of the interests in the
reorganized debtor.
2 9
Again: If the going-concern value in the above illustration were
$1,2oo,ooo instead of $7oo,ooo, a plan giving $i,oooooo of new com-
26. See Dodd, note 8 supra at 1133-1134; Friendly and Tondel, The Relative Treat-
ment of Securities in Railroad Reorganizations under Section 77 (194o) 7 LAW AND
CONTEmP. PoaB. 420, 423.
27. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U. S. io6 (x939).
28. Friendly and Tondel, note 25 supra at 424.
29. In addition to the plan being unfair, the security holders might be subjected to
liabilities under state law regulating the issuance of stock for a consideration less than
its stated value. See Brockett v. Winkle Terra Cotta Co., 81 F. (2d) 949 (C. C. A.
8th, 1936).
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mon stock to the secured bondholders and $200,oo0 of new common
stock to the old stockholders would normally be fair. Under the same
facts, a plan giving $I,ooo,ooo par of preferred stock to the old se-
cured bondholders and $200,000 par of common stock to the old com-
mon stockholders, is not necessarily fair. It may be fair, or otherwise,
depending upon the value of the control of the corporation vested in
the common stock and its unlimited right to dividends after payment
of dividends on the preferred stock, as compared with the value of the
preferences given to the preferred stock
In this regard, it is important to remember that stockholders are
entitled to the value of their equities just as much as secured and un-
secured creditors. If, in the last of the foregoing illustrations, the
secured bondholders are given $8ooooo par value of preferred stock
and the entire issue of $200,000 par value of common stock, while
the old common stockholders receive options to purchase $200,000
par value of common stock for $ioo,ooo, the plan will be unfair to
the old common stockholders. It is not fair to compel stockholders to
pay $Ioo,ooo in cash as a condition to their right to secure the value
of their equity.
This does not mean that a plan may never give creditors or stock-
holders rights or options to purchase shares of stock. If the equities
of such creditors or stockholders are small and uncertain, a plan may
give such rights or options if their value is approximately equal to
the value of the equities. Even if such creditors or stockholders have
no equities, a right to subscribe for shares may be given if the amount
to be paid on the exercise of the right is approximately the value of
the shares subscribed for, and if the right must be exercised immedi-
ately. A right or option to purchase in the future-regardless of the
price specified-gives an interest in the corporation which may be jus-
tified only by the value of the present equity of the creditors or stock-
holders receiving the right or option or by the new cash or other
consideration paid by them.
The Boyd Case
The foregoing principles are not the only ones to be applied in
the determination of interests to be given under a plan. The so-called
doctrine of the Boyd 3 0 case, based upon the law of fraudulent convey-
ances, is also applicable. 3 1 Under this doctrine, it is held that a debtor
may not withhold any of his property from seizure for the satisfaction
30. Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482 (1913).
31. See 2 GERDES, op. cit. supra note i, §§ lO83-1o85 ; GLENN, FRAUDULENT CON-
VEYANCES AND PREFERENCES (1940) §§ 224, 225.
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of the claims of his creditors, regardless of whether such property has
been acquired by purchase or gift. Where the assets of a debtor are
divided among its creditors, if any property of the debtor is given to,
or is available for the satisfaction of the claim of, a specific creditor
who surrenders his right and returns the property to the debtor, such
property immediately becomes available for the payment of other cred-
itors whose claims have not been paid in full. The fact that the prop-
erty has been donated by another creditor does not put it beyond the
reach of creditors, and any device or plan which seeks to prevent them
from seizing such property for the satisfaction of their claims, is
fraudulent as against them.
In the Boyd case, secured creditors who were entitled to all the
assets of the corporation voluntarily gave an interest in such assets to
the stockholders although unsecured creditors received nothing. The
court held that the giving of an interest in the property to the stock-
holders was equivalent to giving it to the debtor corporation, and that
the value of the interest given to stockholders should be made available
for the payment of such claims of the corporation as were still unsat-
isfied. For the purpose of doing justice the veil of the corporate
entity was pierced and the stockholders were treated as if they were
the corporation.
The application of the Boyd doctrine to a plan under Chapter X
may be illustrated as follows: The corporation has as its sole asset
a hotel with a going-concern value of $Iooooo. Bonds in the amount
of $2ooo0o secured by a first mortgage on the property, are out-
standing; there is a bond for $5o,ooo secured by a second mortgage;
and there are unsecured creditors and common stockholders.
Under these facts, no plan would be fair unless it gives all inter-
ests in the reorganized corporation to the bondholders. But, suppose
the bonds arid mortgage were owned by a single individual, X, who
agrees, with full knowledge of his rights, to a plan under which he
gets a new bond for $75,000, secured by a first mortgage, and the
stockholders retain their stock; the holder of the second mortgage and
the unsecured creditors get nothing. Under the Boyd doctrine the
value of the interest given to stockholders can be reached by the holder
of the second mortgage and the unsecured creditors for the satisfac-
tion of their claims.
C. Statutory Standards
Section 77B set up a new statutory standard for plans. Under
it a judge could not confirm a plan unless he was satisfied that "it is
fair and equitable and does not discriminate in favor of any class of
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creditors or stockholders".32  Although it is commonly believed that
this language should be construed to prevent recognition of a plan
providing for distribution to any subordinate class of creditors or
stockholders unless all prior classes have had their claims recognized
in full, even if there has been no violation of the Boyd doctrine,33 the
United States Supreme Court has never passed upon the question.
Thus, under the facts of the last illustration, assume that X has
agreed to a plan which gives him a new bond for $75,000 secured by
a first mortgage, gives all of the common stock to unsecured cred-
itors who hold tort claims against the corporation, and gives nothing
to the holder of the second mortgage or to the old stockholders. Such
a plan would not violate the contractual or common-law rights of the
second mortgagee; nor would it violate the Boyd doctrine, since it does
not divert assets to stockholders . 4  The plan should nevertheless be
held to be a violation of the statute.
The facts permit of two different inferences: (i) that the first
mortgagee intended a direct gift to the tort claimants; or (2) that the
first mortgagee merely consented to a reduction in his claim. If the
first mortgagee intends a gift, there seems to be no principle in law
or in equity which would require us to make available to the second
mortgagee the interest in the corporation which belongs to the first
mortgagee and which he voluntarily transfers to other creditors of
ihe corporation.
On the other hand, if the first mortgagee merely intends to ac-
cept a reduction in his claim, the estate of the debtor becomes the bene-
ficiary, and the assets freed by the reduction in claim should be made
available for the satisfaction of the claims of other creditors. A
further question then arises: As a reduction in the amount of the
claim of the first mortgage automatically reduces the first lien on the
property, does such reduction inure solely to the benefit of the second
mortgagee who has a first claim against the property after the lien of
the first mortgage has been satisfied? Or should we consider that the
lien of the second mortgage had no value prior to the consummation
of the plan and that the second mortgagee must therefore be treated
as an unsecured creditor for all purposes in the proceeding? A fair
and equitable plan under the circumstances would provide that the
$25,ooo interest surrendered by the first mortgagee be distributed
32. § 77B (f) ().
33. See Frank, Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate Reor-
ganization (1933) E9 VA&. L. REv. 541, 551-553; Swaine, Reorganization of Corpora-
tions, Certain Developments of the Last Decade (1927) VIII SOmE LEGA PHASES OF
CoRpoRATE FINANCING REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION 1926-1930, 131, 142.
34. New York Trust Co. v. Continental & Com. Trust and Say. Bank, 26 F. (2d)
872 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928).
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among all the unsecured creditors, treating the second mortgagee as
part of this group, because the second mortgage lien was valueless.
The first mortgagee could have insisted on a plan under which
'he would be entitled to all of the property of the corporation. He
could later have donated an interest to anybody (provided the alleged
donation be not made under the terms of an agreement, made prior
to the confirmation of the plan, which was intended to influence action
in the proceeding). The plan should, however, not be made the vehicle
for such a donation. Each class of creditors should act for its own
interests in the plan, and any reduction in claim accepted unanimously
by any class should be considered as being made for the benefit of the
debtor's estate. This avoids troublesome questions of intent and also
discourages agreements to buy off obstreperous and subordinate classes
at the expense of other classes.
If, in the foregoing situation, the first mortgage had covered a
number of bonds and all holders of the bonds had voluntarily given
up part of their interests, similar principles would be involved. But,
if even one holder of the bonds had objected, the plan must be held to
be unfair. No minority, no matter how small, may be deprived of
its right to payment in full before any interest is given to a subordi-
nate class.3 5
Chapter X retains the requirement of Section 77B that the plan
must be "fair and equitable" " but eliminates the requirement that it
must "not discriminate in favor of any class of creditors". But no
change in the law was intended by this change in language. 87
The plan in the Los Angeles Lumber Co. 8 case violated not only
the common-law and contractual rights of the bondholders and the doc-
trine of the Boyd case, but also the statutory standards of Section 77B
and Chapter X. Bondholders were not allotted the full equivalent of
their interest in the debtor; and stockholders were given an interest in
the debtor which should have been made available to its creditors.
Chapter X provides further that no plan may be approved by the
court unless the interests of non-accepting classes of creditors and
stockholders are protected by the retention of their interests in such
property, or by payment in cash of their portion of the proceeds of a
sale of the property at not less than an upset price fixed by the court,
or by payment in cash of the appraised value of their interests.3 9
35. Casev. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 3o8 U. S. io6 (1939).
36. §221 (2).
37. See Gerdes, Corporate Reorganizations: Changes Effected by Chapter X of the
Bankruptcy Act (1938) 52 HAv. L. REv. x, 34; SEN. REP. No. 1916, 75th Cong., 3d
Sess. (1938) pp. 35-36.
38. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 3o8 U. S. 1o6 (1939).
39. § 26 (7) (8). Identical provisions were contained in Section 77B (b) (4) (5).
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Under these provisions, a class which refuses to cooperate in
preserving the going-concern value of the assets of the corporation may
not insist on getting cash in full for its proportion of the going-concern
values, preserved in spite of its failure to cooperate. To permit such
recovery would result in grave injustice to the other classes of creditors
and stockholders, who will be compelled not only to accept securities for
their interests but also, in all probability, to raise the cash necessary to
pay the non-accepting class. Liquidation must inevitably follow if all
classes refuse to accept payment in securities. Equitably, therefore,
non-accepting classes should be paid in cash the liquidation,40 and not
the going-concern, value of their claims and interests. It is not suffi-
cient however to offer to any class of creditors merely the liquidation
value of their interest in the debtor. They are entitled to a fair offer
of the going-concern value of their claims in securities. Only if this
offer is not accepted may they be compelled to take, in cash, the liquida-
tion value of their interests. As used in Subsections (7) and (8) of
Section 216 of Chapter X, the value of their claims against or equity
in the property of the debtor must be construed to be such property
without the increment in value due to the preservation of the business
as a going concern.
To illustrate: Suppose the liquidation value of the property of the
debtor is $6oo,ooo, and its going-concern value is $i,ooo,ooo; the
secured indebtedness is $5ooooo; unsecured claims amount to $300,-
ooo; and there are outstanding shares of common stock. The liqui-
dation value of the claims of unsecured creditors therefore is $ioo,-
ooo and the interests of stockholders have no liquidation value. The
going-concern value of the claims of unsecured creditors is $300,000
and the going-concern value of the interests of stockholders is
$200,000.
Under these facts, any reorganization under which the creditors
are compelled to put up $200,000 in cash to pay the stockholders who
have not accepted the plan, would not be fair or equitable; nor would
it be fair or equitable if the unsecured creditors are deprived of their
additional $200,000 of going-concern value by a compulsory liquida-
tion because the stockholders have refused to accept the plan. Since
the stockholders would get nothing by liquidation, and since they are
unwilling to take the securities which fully and fairly represent the
40. "Liquidation" value does not mean scrap value; it may be defined as the higher
of the two amounts which may reasonably be expected if the property is sold over a
reasonable period of time by a person who actively seeks a buyer, and if the property
is sold in the aggregate or in separate lots. See First National Bank v. Flershem, 29o
U. S. 504, 526 (1934), where the court, in an equity receivership, said that the dissent-
ing creditor was entitled to "that sum in cash which it would have received if the prop-
erty had been sold at a proper price".
PLANS OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATION
going-concern value of their interests in the debtor, they should re-
ceive nothing in cash.
Suppose the situation were reversed in the foregoing illustration:
The unsecured creditors refuse to accept a plan which makes adequate
provision for the issuance to them of securities fully representing their
going-concern interest of $3ooooo. The plan has been accepted by
the secured creditors and the stockholders. Under the facts as thus
altered, the unsecured non-assenting creditors should not receive more
than $iooooo in cash if the plan provides for an appraisal of their
claims against the property. If the plan provides for a sale of the prop-
erty, subject to the lien of the first mortgage, at not less than an upset
price, then the upset price should be fixed at $iooooo.
On first impression, this result seems inequitable, and unduly
favorable to the stockholders. It should be remembered, however, that
the unsecured creditors have rejected a fair offer of the going-concern
value of their claims.
The Boyd doctrine is not violated in the last variation of the illus-
tration because: (i) the fair offer required by the Boyd case was made
to the unsecured creditors and rejected by them; 41 (2) the cash re-
quired to pay the $ioo,ooo to the unsecured creditors in practically all
cases would be paid by the stockholders, and as such sum, by hypothesis,
is the reasonable liquidation value of the assets above the liens of the
secured creditors, it is sufficient new consideration to support the in-
terest given to the old stockholders; 42 and (3) since Chapter X re-
quires that dissenting classes be paid only this amount, the Boyd doc-
trine (even if this were a violation of it) must be deemed to have been
modified to this extent by the statute.
D. Determination of Values
There is no convenient rule of thumb for determining the going-
concern value of the reorganized debtor, or of the securities allotted
under the plan. While there is fairly general agreement that the
going-concern value of a business depends primarily upon its prospec-
tive profits and that a capitalization of such profits is the best means
of fixing this value,43 no precise formula has been, or can be, evolved
to determine the rate on which the capitalization should be based 44
or the extent to which valuations based upon the capitalization of esti-
mated profits should be modified by the consideration of other factors.
41. Northern Pacific Ry. v. B6yd, 228 U. S. 482, 5o8 (1913).
42. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 3o8 U. S. io6, 122 (939).
43. I BONmiGHT, VALUATIO N OF PROPERTY (1937) Chapter XII; 2 id., 88o-88i,
884-889; DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS (1934) 165-170; FiNLzETra, op.
cit. supra note i at 557-558.
44. DEmwNG, op. cit. supra note 43 at i69-170.
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Additional elements which may enter into the determination of going-
concern values are: (i) original cost of fixed assets, less depreciation;
(2) replacement value of the property; (3) rate of obsolescence of
assets due to technical developments in the industry; (4) stability and
prospects of the industry; (5) strength of financial set-up and ability
of the corporation to weather financial storms; and (6) efficiency and
integrity of the management.
Theoretically, the sum of the market prices of the securities issued
by the reorganized corporation ought to be equal to the going-concern
value of the corporation. Actually, it may be more, or less-usually
less, because the new management has not yet demonstrated its ability
to make the estimated profits. In addition to the value of the corpora-
tion as a going concern, the following elements must be considered
in the valuation of its securities: (i) maturity date of the security; (2)
rate of interest or dividend, and whether fixed or contingent; (3) value
and liquidity of collateral or mortgage security, if any; (4) preferences
or priorities upon general distribution; (5) legal remedies for failure
to pay; (6) nature of the business; (7) reputation of the management
for efficiency and integrity; (8) policies of management as to payment
of dividends, etc.; (9) number and dispersion of holdings of the se-
curities; (io) listing on an exchange or existence of over-the-counter
market; and (I I) extent to which market of the security is controlled
or manipulated.
Valuatiofns of businesses and of securities are troublesome. Such
valuations in the present state of our knowledge cannot be mathemati-
cally exact except in unusual and simple situations. Courts recognize
this fact in passing upon the fairness of plans, and do not usually seek
to substitute their views of value for those of the interested parties,
unless clearly erroneous. The determination of the values of the
claims against and interests in a corporation, and of the values of the
interests to be substituted for them in the reorganized corporation, is,
at best, a rough approximation. There is a twilight or debatable zone
in every situation. So long as the valuations on which the plan is
based fall within this zone, it cannot be said to be unfair. In choos-
ing the actual value to be used in the formulation of the plan, however,
preference should perhaps be given to some value in the upper, rather
than the lower, part of this zone; otherwise, a junior claim or interest
may be unjustly eliminated. Any injustice which might otherwise
result to the holders of senior claims or interests through the use of
higher rather than lower valuations, may be minimized, when doubt
exists, by giving them senior securities, if this may be done without
creating an unwise and unwieldly corporate structure.
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E. Formulation of the Plan
The plan of reorganization is the charter which sets forth the
results desired through the reorganization proceeding. It is the aim
and goal of every reorganization, the success or failure of which de-
pends upon the merits of the plan and the benefits secured through
its consummation.
In practice, the first step in the preparation of a plan is an analysis
of the business.45  A diagnosis should be made of the causes of its
financial difficulties. The plan should aim to cure the financial and
business ailments of the debtor.46  It should not merely provide im-
mediate relief, but should be drastic enough to assure continued sol-
vency of the enterprise' even under unfavorable conditions.
In the distribution of the new securities among those having in-
terests and equities, creditors and stockholders, so far as is practicable,
should be given obligations and securities which correspond to the
obligations and securities originally held by them.47  Creditors who
originally bargained for mortgage or other security, should, if possible,
be permitted to retain their security; creditors who bargained for a
short-term period of credit should receive cash or short-term securi-
ties; creditors who invested in long-term securities should receive simi-
lar securities.
Likewise, the retention in the plan of the old relative priorities of
the claims and interests having an actual present equity in the assets
of the corporation, is desirable in all casesunless it results in a capital
structure which is too stratified and complex to be sound.48
The feasibility of the plan-its readjustment of the capital struc-
ture to meet the corporate needs-is, however, of paramount impor-
tance. Feasibility must not be sacrificed to maintain the old relative
priorities in the new capital structure. If it is desirable to simplify
the old capital structure, new securities of the same class may be given
to classes of creditors having different priorities, provided that each
class receives sufficient of such securities to give it the full value of
its interest or equity in the assets of the debtor.
The going-concern value of the assets is a fact on which differ-
ences of opinion are bound to exist. Such value may, .like any other
fact to be determined in the proceedings, be the subject of a compro-
mise by the interested parties.49  If the court believes the compromise
45. 1 GnDms, op. cit. supra note I, C. 3.
46. 2 id., c. 2r.
47. See Dodd, note 8 supra at 1133-II34.
48. See Warner, Some Financial and Economic Problems in Railroad Recapitaliza-
tiOns (1940) 7 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 438, 445-449.
49. That legitimate compromises, i. e., compromises not based solely upon nuisance
value, might be made was recognized in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 3o8
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reasonably fixes the disputed value, that should be given effect regard-
less of the objections of class minorities. The court should not, how-
ever, justify as a compromise an agreement which is intended to give
to junior classes who have no equity in the assets, a participation in
the distribution of obligations and securities under the plan.
A class of claims having a readily realizable liquidation value
equal to the full amounts of the claims, is in a strategic position which
enables the holders of such claims to insist that they receive securities
having not only a going-concern value equal to their claims but also
a probable market value of the same amount, because upon consumma-
tion of a plan without acceptance by it, such a class must be paid the
full amount of its claims in cash. If the reorganization is not con-
summated, the class will be paid in full, in cash, on a liquidation of
the assets.
III. RELATIVE PRIORITY THEORY
The foregoing principles have not all received universal approval.
Belief is widely held that interests in the reorganized corporation may
be given to classes of creditors and stockholders who have no equity
based on going-concern values, provided that the old relative prefer-
ences of all classes of creditors and stockholders as to claims on earn-
ings and on dissolution are preserved. This theory is known as the
"Relative Priority Theory", 50 as opposed to the "Absolute Priority
Theory", discussed hereinbefore. 51
But the term "Relative Priority Theory" is misleading. It does
not adequately describe the theory. Both the relative and absolute
priority theories call for a recognition of the relative priorities of the
old classes of claims and interest in determining the value of their
equities in the assets of the debtor. The absolute priority theory, how-
ever, limits participation under the plan to the values so found,
while the relative priority theory permits participation by classes who
no longer have an equity. The recent decisions of the United States
Supreme Court in the Los Angeles Lumber Co. 5 2 and United States
Realty 5 3 cases have clearly indicated a disposition to accept the abso-
lute priority theory rather than the relative priority theory. But the
U. S. Io6, 130 (1939). Where there is an honest doubt as to valuation, and not an
attempt merely to take advantage of nuisance value, this would seem to be a legitimate
issue to compromise. See Dodd, note I supra at 714.
5o. The terms "Relative Priority Theory" and "Absolute Priority Theory" were
first used by Bonbright and Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights (1928)
28 COL. L. RErv. 127.
51. See p. 46 supra.
52. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U. S. io6 (I939).
53. Securities and Exchange Commission v. United States Realty and Improve-
ment Co., 310 U. S. 434 (940).
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controversy between the two schools of thought has not been com-
pletely allayed.
54
Professor E. Merrick Dodd has given us a succinct statement of
the relative priority theory:
"According to that theory, a reorganization plan is fair to
creditors if it preserves to them their former preferences with
respect to both their rights on dissolution and their claim on earn-
ings, so that, for example, the holders of 6 per cent. debentures, if
given 6 per cent. preferred shares with a dissolution preference
equal to the face amount of their claims to principal and accrued
interest, would have no legal grievance even if shareholders were
given new common shares without a finding that they had any
equity in the enterprise." :5
A proponent of the theory has stated that claims or interests
which have been shown by a valuation in a proceeding under Chapter
X to have no value may nevertheless be given a share in the reor-
ganized corporation if the former relative priorities are retained; that,
if the full priority of a senior class is maintained, any junior non-
entitled class may be included; that if the holders of mortgage bonds of
an insolvent debtor are given new preferred stock for the full amounts
of their claims, with a dividend rate equal to the old interest rate, the
old stockholders may be given all the new common stock; and that the
holders of mortgage bonds of an insolvent debtor may be compelled
to accept preferred stock for part of their claims and common stock
for the balance, while the old common stock retains the remainder of
the common stock of the reorganized debtor.58
Criticism of the, Theory
The relative priority theory, as hereinbefore defined, is unsound.
It brings further confusion to a situation already confused; it adds
uncertainty to uncertainty. It does not solve the real problem-the
valuation of interests in a corporation-but distracts attention from
that problem by substituting a rule of thumb which is totally inade-
quate.
54. See dissenting opinions by Simons, J., in the recent cases of Whitmore Plaza
Corporation v. Smith, 113 F. (2d) 210 (C. C. A. 6th, i94o) and Metropolitan Hold-
ing Co. v. Weadock, 113 F. (2d) 2o7, 209 (C. C. A. 6th, 194o) in which he states:
"The underlying philosophy of all of the reorganization provisions in the Bankruptcy
Act, including its agricultural adjustment provisions and the railroad and corporation
reorganization sections, is that a distressed debtor should have an opportunity for re-
habilitation, and that there is no inequity or constitutional infirmity in providing such
opportunity so long as creditors are protected in their priorities to the full fair value
of their security at the time of the reorganization ... " See Swanstrom, note i supra.
55. Dodd, note i supra at 732.
56. Fx NLsrrE, op. cit. supra note I at 457-458.
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Specific objections to the relative priority theory are that it de-
prives creditors and stockholders of their legal and contractual rights;
it fails to define the extent to which junior creditors and stockholders
who have no equity may be granted interests under the plan, and pro-
vides no adequate substitute for well-recognized principles of law and
equity; its apparent avoidance of the necessity of valuing interests in
the reorganized corporation is illusory; and it tends to produce an
unwieldy and undesirable capital structure for the reorganized corpo-
ration.
When people extend credit to or purchase the securities of a cor-
poration they bargain and pay for certain rights and privileges in the
enforcement of their claims. Creditors who bargain for and receive a
first lien on assets of the corporation as security for their claims, pay
for this additional protection-they must be content with the promise
of a fixed low rate of interest. Creditors agreeing to take a subordi-
nate position in the hierarchy of claims upon distribution receive the
promise of a higher fixed rate of interest. Preferred stockholders,
lower still in the scale of priorities, get the possibility of an income
greater than the interest promised to unsecured creditors. And, finally,
common stockholders usually get the possibility of income which is
limited only by the profits of the corporation, and, in addition, collec-
tively, get control of management. The price depends upon the rights
granted and the risks taken-the more valuable the rights granted
and the less the risk of loss in the event of default by the debtor, the
greater the price which is paid.
These bargained-for rights of prior classes are not given effect
if subordinate securities are given to junior classes which have no
equity in the assets of the debtor. Consider the following illustration:
Mortgage bonds of $i,ooo,ooo; no unsecured creditors; common stock-
holders; value of assets, $700,ooo. The plan proposes to give to the
bondholders $i,ooo,ooo of new preferred stock, with a dividend rate
equal to the rate of interest on the old bonds, and to permit the old
common stockholders to retain their shares.
Under our principles of law and equity the bondholders in the
foregoing situation are entitled to appropriate all of the assets of the
debtor to the satisfaction of their claims, since the value of such
assets is less than the amount of their claims. Do they get this under
the proposed plan? By hypothesis, the total value of the assets is
$70o,ooo. No matter how interests in such assets may be divided, the
total value of such interests cannot exceed $7o0,ooo. To the extent
to which an interest is given to stockholders, therefore, the value of
the interest remaining for bondholders is necessarily diminished.
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The value of the interest given to stockholders is substantial. They
indirectly manage and control the company. They elect the directors
of the corporation, and, through such directors, control the selection
and compensation of its officers and employees, and determine its busi-
ness, financial and investment policies. They may cause the corpora-
tion to take unnecessary business risks in the hope that success will
enhance the value of the assets of the corporation sufficiently to show
substantial values for their shares of stock and substantial profits for
distribution as dividends. They have every incentive to gamble, since
they have everything to gain and nothing to lose. -They are gambling
with the assets of the bondholders, who sustain the losses and who
get only a part of the profits if the gamble succeeds. Can there be any
doubt as to the value of these rights given to the stockholders?
Implicit in the foregoing discussion is the assumption that no new
consideration is required under the plan from the stockholders for the
retention by them of the shares of common stock. To the extent of
the value of any new consideration required to be given by them-
whether by payment in cash, or binding management agreement, or
otherwise--stockholders having no equity may be given an interest in
the assets without adversely affecting the fairness of the plan.5
If it were conceded that values may be taken away from cred-
itors having a priority and given to creditors having a subordinate
position, or taken from creditors and given to stockholders, an impor-
tant question would remain: To what extent are members of the prior
class to be deprived of value for the benefit of members of subordi-
nate classes?
Under Chapter X, it is contemplated that the disinterested trustee
will propose plans,58 the Securities and Exchange Commission will re-
port on plans referred to it,5a and the court will approve plans 6 0---all
prior to the solicitation of acceptances from creditors or stockholders.6"
Even if given without solicitation, no acceptance, and no authority
to accept, is valid if given before action on the plan by the trustee, the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the court, unless the court
has consented to such solicitation. Since such consent has been rarely,
if ever, given, it is apparent that all of these agencies must pass upon
the fairness of the plan before they know whether, or to what extent,
holders of prior securities are willing to permit participation by junior
-securities which have no equity. If the only test is to be the willing-
57. See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., So8 U. S. xo6, 117, 121-122
(1939).
58. § x6.
59. § 172.
6o. § i74.
61. § 176.
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ness of the senior classes to make provision for such junior classes
as have no equity, how is such willingness to be determined in advance
of solicitation or receipt of acceptances? It is apparent that these
agencies in passing upon the plan would have to speculate as to whether
the holders of senior securities would accept the recognition given to
the junior non-entitled classes in the plan. In any event approval by the
court, prior to its acceptance by the senior security holders, of a plan
giving recognition to junior interests having no equities, will unfairly
coerce such senior holders into acceptance of the plan, since the alterna-
tive will be a rejection of the plan and delay in the completion of the
reorganization.
The relative priority theory is sometimes justified on the ground
that going-concern values cannot be determined with exactness.62 The
inexactness of such valuation may be conceded, but proponents of the
theory permit such valuations-inexact as they may be-to exclude
classes of creditors and stockholders. They apply the theory only to
permit an interest to be taken from individual creditors having a pri-
ority when two-thirds of the class agree to give such interest to a sub-
ordinate class. If the valuation is exact enough to justify the elimi-
nation of entire classes, it surely ought to be exact enough for use in
preserving the interests of individual creditors under the plan.
Proponents of the relative priority theory state that dissenting
minorities of classes of creditors accepting the plan should be bound
by the action of the majority-as in a composition under the old Sec-
tion 12 of the Bankruptcy Act. 63 But such a composition required
more than the mere assent of a majority of the creditors; it required
that the court find that the composition was for the best interest of the
creditors-that under it creditors would receive the equivalent of what
they would get if the bankruptcy were continued. The relative prior-
ity theory includes no such limitation upon the power of the majority.
It permits the majority to deprive the minority of part of their equity
in order to grant an interest to a class which is not entitled to any
interest, and it takes away the power of the court to prevent this di-
version.
When Sections 77 and 77B were enacted in 1933 and 1934 they
were included in Chapter VIII of the Bankruptcy Act which was en-
titled "Provisions for the Relief of Debtors". It is argued that the
intent was to benefit stockholders (who, collectively, for practical pur-
poses, constitute the debtor) as well as creditors. 64  This may be con-
62. FINLET-rE, op. cit. supra note I at 458-459.
63. Downtown Inv. Ass'n v. Boston Metropolitan Bldgs., 8I F. (2d) 314, 323 (C.
C. A. Ist, 1936).
64. See dissenting opinion by Simons, J., in Metropolitan Holding Co. v. Weadock,
113 F. (2d) 2o7, 2og (C. C. A. 6th, 594o).
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ceded. But it does not follow that the benefits which are given to
stockholders are such as must necessarily result from depriving cred-
itors of their full legal right of priority. Stockholders do benefit from
the going-concern values which are preserved by reorganization and
which are sacrificed by liquidation, but only if such going-concern
values exceed the claims of creditors. In this manner, stockholders
are benefited in most, although not in all, cases.
The relative priority theory does not dispense with the necessity
of valuing the assets of the reorganized debtor. Advocates of the
theory admit that such valuation is necessary to determine the classes
entitled to participate as of right. In any event, th statute requires
the court to pass upon the fairness of the plan,"5 and the United States
Supreme Court has held that no court may pass upon a plan unless it
has full and adequate information regarding the entire situation, in-
cluding the value of the assets. 6
It has been said that shares of stock have become more and more
widely distributed among the small investors of the country, and that
the application of the absolute priority theory will throw the heaviest
losses upon those, who, as a class, are less able to assume them than
are the holders of secured bonds or other prime securities of the cor-
poration. 67 In view of the fact that the billions of dollars invested
by our savings banks and life insurance companies in the highest grades
of bonds are the funds of small investors, it is extremely unlikely that
the foregoing statement is correct. Even if it were correct, however,
the wisdom of encouraging further investment in such junior securi-
ties is very doubtful. The relative priority theory, by cutting down
the participation of the secured issues in order to give an interest to
junior creditors and stockholders, would discourage investment in high
grade securities and encourage investment in the junior issues by
persons wh5 ought to purchase the sounder securities. By giving to
prime securities the full benefit of their priorities, we enable persons
who desire to minimize the possibility of loss through defaults in the
payment of interest and principal, and who are willing to pay the price,
to secure what they wish. Investments may be made for widows and
orphans with better assurance that they will receive the bargained-for
benefits.
The application of the relative priority theory will also encourage
the retention, and even the extension, of the present complicated and
unwieldly stratification of our corporate structures. New underlying
securities will be issued to secure additional capital--old interests will
65. §221 (2).
66. National Surety Co. v. Coriell, 289 U. S. 426, 436 (1933).
67. Bonbright and Bergerman, note 50 supra at i58-ix$.
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be retained, stratum by stratum, regardless of whether they still have
equities in the assets of the debtor. Simplification is needed-not
greater complication. A plan which fails to simplify a corporate struc-
ture which is already too complex fails to accomplish one of its most
important objectives.
The relative priority theory runs counter to our present concep-
tion of proper corporate practice; it permits securities to be issued which
have little, if any, value. Innocent investors may be, and will be,
deceived into buying such securities.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion essays a critical analysi of some of
the fundamental principles to be applied in the formulation of a plan
of corporate reorganization. No attempt has been made to sustain,
by copious citations of cases, the views expressed, although it is be-
lieved that such views are in accord with the law embodied in the deci-
sions of our courts.
Space limitations have prevented consideration of a number of
interesting questions, among them: the time as of which equities in
the assets of the debtor must be valued; the rate of interest which
should be allowed on claims during the proceeding; the amounts for
which claims should be allowed on long-term bonds having either an
abnormally high, or an abnormally low, interest rate; the basis for the
classification of claims; and the recognition which may be given to
contingent claims.
If this article succeeds in arousing new interest in the underlying
concepts of ieorganization it will have accomplished its purpose.
